Introduction
It is a pervasive property of natural languages that they display agreement between predicates and their arguments, henceforth predicate-argument agreement. Descriptively, predicate-argument agreement holds if certain features of an independent argument DP are marked on the predicate. While predicate-argument agreement is generally an obligatory and productive morphological process, many languages display restrictions to the effect that certain agreement markers are banned in certain environments. Here I will discuss two such agreement restrictions found in Halkomelem Salish. Both these restrictions appear to be sensitive to the grammatical person of the argument. i) 3 rd person agreement does not occur with intransitive subjects. This suggests that Halkomelem displays split ergativity which is sensitive to person; ii) 3 rd person subject agreement cannot co-occur with 2 nd person object agreement. This suggests that Halkomelem has transitive gaps that are sensitive to person.
Both types of agreement restrictions are found in many languages of the world and have been argued to be the result of the so called person-hierarchy (Silverstein 1976; Dixon 1994) . According to a person-hierarchy approach, agreement restrictions of the type introduced above arise because certain persons are higher ranked than others and higher ranked persons naturally align with higher ranked arguments. This type of analysis is especially prominent in functional typological approaches (including Optimality Theory).
The status of the person-hierarchy is however not clear in a formal framework such as the principles and parameters framework (Chomsky 1981) and its minimalist incarnations (Chomsky 1995 and subsequent work) . That is, however successful the person-hierarchy is at a descriptive level, it is not clear where and how it operates in the grammar of natural languages. Researchers within this framework generally agree that the person-hierarchy is not a primitive of the grammar (Newmeyer 1998) and consequently they attempt to derive person-hierarchy effects from independently established principles of the grammar (Jelinek 1993; Alexiadou and Anagnostopoulou 2002; Jelinek and Carnie 2003) .
The main objective of this paper is to show that the apparent personhierarchy effects of Halkomelem Salish (discussed in detail in section 2) are not the result of the person-hierarchy. I show that the relevant restrictions should not even be described in terms of the person-hierarchy since the sensitivity to person is only apparent (section 3). Consequently, any approach that seeks to analyze the Halkomelem agreement restrictions in terms of a person-hierarchy will not achieve descriptive adequacy. This holds for approaches which take the person-hierarchy to be a primitive of the grammar (as in OT-approaches such as Aissen 1999; Aissen 1999) but also for approaches which seek to directly build the person-hierarchy into the functional hierarchy (as in Jelinek & Carnie 2003) . Instead I show that the apparent person-hierarchy effects are the result of the morpho-syntax of agreement morphology and the existence of certain (partly arbitrary) paradigmatic gaps. This holds for both types of restrictions. I discuss apparent split ergativity in section 4 and transitive gaps in section 5. In section 6 I conclude.
The facts: two apparent person-hierarchy effects in Halkomelem Salish
Halkomelem is a Central Coast Salish language spoken on the West coast of British Columbia (Canada).
1 Like most languages of the North West coast, Halkomelem is a head-marking language: full DP-arguments are optional and we find a rich agreement system which marks the person and number of a given argument directly on the predicate. In this section I will introduce the Halkomelem agreement system (2.1) and the two types of agreement restrictions that appear to be due to a person-hierarchy: person sensitive split ergativity (2.2) and person sensitive transitive gaps (2.3).
Agreement in Halkomelem
Predicate-argument agreement in Halkomelem is a complex system. As illustrated in (1), the (verbal) predicate bears two morphemes that indicate the person and number of the two arguments involved: the object marker -ox and the subject marker -es. The corresponding full DP-arguments are optional.
(1) kw 'éts-l-óx- If we restrict ourselves to matrix, transitive clauses without an auxiliary, the predicate-argument agreement pattern of Halkomelem can be described as follows. There are two full paradigms: one for object and one for subject agreement (table 1) . Object agreement always appears closer to the verb and thus precedes subject agreement (table 2). Everything else being equal, we might expect that we can now predict the form of all clauses. That is, once we know the inventory of predicate-argument agreement (i.e. the paradigms) and the linear order holding between two cooccurring agreement endings we should be able to generate the predicateargument agreement patterns of all clauses. As it turns out, this is not the case. Rather, there are a number of restrictions on predicate-argument agreement which complicate matters. Galloway (1980: 126) Accordingly, we need to revise the predicate-argument agreement paradigms to reflect the sensitivity to the transitivity of the predicate: The question we are faced with then is how these restrictions are to be analyzed and whether or not they can receive a unified analysis.
Since both type of agreement restrictions have in common that they involve a certain sensitivity to person, previous analyses have treated them as the effects of the person-hierarchy (Jelinek and Demers 1983; Gerdts 1988a; Aissen 1999) .
How the person-hierarchy accounts for the agreement restrictions
For reasons of space I will only discuss in detail person-hierarchy approaches which take the person-hierarchy to be a primitive of the grammar. All problems I identify for these approaches carry over to analyses that seek to derive the person-hierarchy because -as I will show -person-hierarchy accounts already fail at the descriptive level.
According to any person-hierarchy account á la Silverstein (1976) , natural languages make use of a (semantically grounded) hierarchy of potential (nominal) agents in transitive sentences. The core insight of all personhierarchy analyses is that the higher the nominal on the hierarchy, the more likely it is to serve as the agent of the event. If the argument is more likely to be an AGENT the better suited it is to function as the subject of the clause. In other words, in the unmarked case, a nominal which is higher on the personhierarchy in (6) is mapped onto the grammatical function which is higher on an independently motivated argument-hierarchy as in (7): subjects are structurally higher than objects, for example. Let us start with the question as to how person-based split ergativity is derived. There are two ways in which the person-hierarchy plays a role here: first, it defines the types of nominals which pattern in an ergative way as summarized in (8).
Moreover, the ergative pattern itself can be viewed as the result of alignment constraints between nominal types and arguments which regulate the morphological marking of 3 rd person arguments. In particular, if the argument realization is well-aligned such that the lower ranked 3 rd person is realized as the lower ranked object, then the 3 rd person argument is unmarked. If, on the other hand, the argument realization is ill-aligned such that the lower ranked 3 rd person is realized as the higher ranked subject, then the 3 rd person argument is morphologically marked:
This derives only part of the ergative pattern, however. The alignment constraints are mute regarding the morphological marking of intransitive subjects. To account for the fact that intransitive subjects pattern with transitive objects (i.e., that they are unmarked), person-hierarchy accounts typically assume that an intransitive subject does not need to be contrasted with another argument and therefore it does not need to be morphologically marked.
Next, we turn to the person-hierarchy account for transitive gaps. Here the person-hierarchy regulates which combinations are ill-formed (and not which argument-realizations are marked). In particular, according to a personhierarchy account gaps can arise if the argument realization is ill-aligned. So for example, when a clause contains both a 2 nd and a 3 rd person argument, it must be the higher ranked argument (i.e., 2 nd person) which is realized as the higher ranked argument (i.e., the subject). The inverse alignment where the 3 rd person functions as the subject and the 3 rd person functions as the object is illaligned and thus ruled out. 
Against a unified analysis for split ergativity and transitive gaps
According to the account based on the person-hierarchy outlined above there is a common source for both split ergativity and transitive gaps: both phenomena are sensitive to person and thus they have been argued to be the result of the workings of the person-hierarchy. On closer inspection however, we observe that there are a number of non-trivial differences between the two types of agreement restrictions which cast doubt on the empirical validity of a unified analysis. First, we observe that in Halkomelem the relevant rankings needed to derive the right results differ across the two types of agreement restrictions. Aissen 1999) . While this might be possible, it results in a non-unified analysis for the two types of agreement restrictions: not only do we have to assume a language-specific person-hierarchy for Halkomelem (with 1 st person unranked), we also have to assume that this language-specific ranking is relativized to the two different agreement restrictions.
Another problem for a unified account has to do with the fact that the effects of the two types of agreement restrictions differ in non-trivial ways. For split ergativity, the person-hierarchy regulates which alignments require morphological marking and which ones don't. In contrast, for transitive gaps the person-hierarchy regulates which alignments are ruled out and which ones are ruled in.
Finally, the two phenomena differ in whether the person-hierarchy effects are absolute or instead relative to other arguments in the clause. The morphological marking of 3 rd person transitive subjects is independent of the other arguments present in the clause. That is, even if the object argument is also 3 rd person -in which case the alignment is not really ill-aligned -3 rd person subjects must be marked:
In contrast, transitive gaps are determined relative to the other person. That is, a 3 rd person subject is only ruled out in the presence of a 2 nd person object but not in the presence of a 1 st or 3 rd person object. These differences between split ergativity and transitive gaps (summarized in table 4) cast serious doubt on the empirical adequacy of any approach which seeks to account for these agreement restrictions in a unified fashion. Even if a unified account is untenable however, it might still be the case that either one of the two agreement restrictions is best explained by means of a person-hierarchy. In the remainder of this section I show that neither split ergativity nor transitive gaps should be viewed as the result of a personhierarchy.
Halkomelem is not really ergative
Most descriptions of Halkomelem treat the pattern of 3 rd person agreement as essentially ergative (Gerdts 1988b) : transitive subjects are associated with a dedicated overt agreement marker (-es) while intransitive subjects have in common with transitive objects that they are unmarked (or rather marked with a zero morpheme). This means that -like in other ergative systemsintransitive subjects pattern with transitive objects (see Table 5 ). On closer inspection however, it turns out that Halkomelem has (in certain well-defined environments) an overt 3 rd person object agreement marker, which sets it apart from the 3 rd person intransitive marker which is always ∅ (Wiltschko 2003) . This suggests that object agreement, but not intransitive subject agreement has allomorphic variants. This allomorphy is morphologically conditioned and depends on the choice of the transitive suffix. That is, Halkomelem has three fully productive transitivizing suffixes: -(e)t/-(e)th which indicates full control of the agent over the event, -l which indicates limited or no control of the agent over the event, and -st/-sth which indicates a causative construal: If we accept this analysis of -exw as an allomorph of 3 rd person object marking 3 , then Halkomelem no longer fits the description of an ergative language: intransitive subjects do not pattern with transitive objects. Rather, we are dealing with a pattern where all three arguments are distinctly marked, at least in the context of two transitivizers (see table 6). According to this analysis then, it is quite unexpected that 3 rd person objects are marked as well. What remains to be accounted for, however, is why there is a person-based split that is sensitive to the transitivity of the predicate (see section 4). Table 7 shows the revised paradigm of Halkomelem agreement. We observe that only 3 rd person (but not 1 st or 2 nd person) agreement varies with the transitivity of the predicate: transitive subjects are marked with -es while intransitive subjects appear unmarked. In the context of subject A'-movement, 3 rd person transitive agreement is lost in Halkomelem (Gerdts 1988a; Kroeber 1999) . This is illustrated in (19): both in subject wh-questions and subject relative clauses, 3 rd person transitive subject agreement is obligatorily lost. This provides us with evidence that it is not the person combination that is ruled out, but instead that the combination of 3 rd person subject agreement and 2 rd person object agreement is ruled out. A particularly striking miminal pair which further illustrates this effect is given in (21). In the canonical VSO order, a 3<2 sentence is ungrammatical while in the marked SVO order, which is arguably derived through A'-movement of the subject, a 3<2 sentence is well-formed. In all these cases, the difference between the ill-formed sentences and the well-formed sentences does not lie in the person combination but instead in the morpheme combination: [3<2] sentences are only ruled out if each of the arguments is associated with an agreement marker on the predicate.
The second environment where we find well-formed [3<2] sentences is passive. Passive sentences in Halkomelem are impersonal constructions (Kroeber 1999) where the underlying object remains in object position and the subject position is occupied by en empty 3 rd person (possibly expletive) element (Wiltschko 2001). 4 Evidence that they are indeed impersonal constructions stems from the fact that agreement with the underlying object in passives is still object agreement (Galloway 1993 , Gerdts 1989 kiss-TRANS-2SG.O.PASS 'Nobody kissed you.'/'You weren't kissed. ' Wiltschko (2001: 6) Finally, there is one more environment where the ban on [3<2] sentences is lifted and again it is a context where the two agreement morphemes do not cooccur. In this case it is the object agreement that is missing rather than the subject agreement (see Wiltschko and Burton 2004) . To see this, we need to look at the independent (emphatic) pronouns of Halkomelem, which are given in Thus, I conclude that the apparent person restriction of transitive gap is indeed an agreement restriction, which cannot be straightforwardly accounted for as the result of the person-hierarchy.
Summary
In this section we have established three main points.
i) The two person sensitive agreement restrictions of Halkomelem (apparent split ergativity and transitive gaps) should not receive a unified analysis ii) Halkomelem agreement does not really display ergative properties, and thus the person-hierarchy based account which seeks to derive person-based split ergativity cannot be maintained
iii) The transitive gaps are not due to a specific (ill-aligned) combination of persons, but is instead a restriction on agreement If however, the observed agreement restrictions are not due to the workings of a person-hierarchy (or however such a hierarchy is derived) the question remains as to how else we can account for these restrictions. In particular, we need to find an answer to two questions: i) What brings about the person-based sensitivity to transitivity such that only 3 rd person agreement varies with the transitivity of the predicate? ii) What rules out the combination of 3 rd person subject and 2 nd person object agreement?
In the rest of this paper I argue that both agreement restrictions come about as the result of the syntactic distribution of Halkomelem agreement morphology in combination with the existence of certain (arbitrary) paradigmatic gaps.
The person-based transitivity split

A morpho-syntactic account
Why is 3 rd person agreement but not 1 st and 2 nd person sensitive to the transitivity of the predicate? I propose that this follows from the fact that 3 rd person subject agreement occupies a different syntactic position than 1 st or 2 nd person subject agreement (Davis 2000, Jelinek and Carnie 2003) . In particular, I propose that 1 st and 2 nd person subject agreement is associated with C while 3 rd person transitive subject agreement is associated with ν:
This means that subject agreement must be split into two separate paradigms: C-agreement and ν-agreement, where ν-agreement is only overt if ν is transitive. This analysis allows us to understand why 3 rd person and only 3 rd person is sensitive to transitivity: information about transitivity is encoded in ν. Therefore, only agreement in ν, but not agreement in C is expected to be sensitive to transitivity. And further, given that agreement in ν is restricted to 3 rd person it follows that only 3 rd person agreement is sensitive to transitivity. In the remainder of this section I provide evidence for each of these claims. In section 4.1 I show that 1 st and 2 nd agreement are associated with C; in section 4.2., I show evidence to the effect that 3 rd person agreement is associated with ν; and finally in section 4.3. I show cross-Salish evidence that the distribution of agreement across the different positions is indeed associated with (partly) arbitrary gaps.
Evidence for C-agreement
Evidence that 1 st and 2 nd person agreement associates with C stems from the following considerations: i) it appears in a position high up in the clause; ii) it is sensitive to clause-typing, a property typically associated with C (Cheng 1991) ; and iii) it is in complementary distribution with complementizers. I discuss each of these properties in turn.
The agreement markers I analyze as instantiating C-agreement are called subject clitics in the Salishan tradition. I argue that their "clitic-like" behavior stems from the fact that they are associated with a position high in the clausal structure (Davis 2000) . I argue that these forms are attached to whatever element occupies C. Specifically, if there is an auxiliary, C-agreement will appear on the auxiliary (27a) and cannot appear on the verb (27b); in the absence of an auxiliary, C-agreement appears on the verb (27c). This pattern is readily explained under the assumption that the so called subject clitics occupy C. They attach to auxiliaries as a result of I-to-C movement (28a), and if there is no auxiliary, the verb itself can move up to C via I (28b).
Evidence that the distribution of these subject clitics is not governed by phonological considerations, i.e., that we are not dealing with a 2 nd position effect stems from the fact that in the absence of an overt auxiliary, the verb may but need not move to C. 6 In this case the so called subject clitic appears in clause-initial position without being clitizized to any preceding host. 'You pl helped him. ' Galloway (1980: 126) The pattern discussed thus far suggests that subject clitics are located in a position higher than V; but this position could in principle be either I or C (see Davis 2000 for the claim that the relevant position is I). I will now show evidence that they are indeed located in C, rather than I.
Subject clitics are sensitive to information encoded in C, namely clausetyping. In particular, subject clitics are restricted to matrix indicative clauses. Other clause-types, such as subjunctive and embedded nominalized clauses, are incompatible with subject clitics. While subjunctive clauses require special subjunctive agreement (30) 
Galloway (1993: 181) Assuming that subject clitics instantiate C-agreement, sensitivity to clausetyping is precisely what we expect. Finally, the above data also show that C-agreement is in complementary distribution with complementizers, another piece of evidence that we are indeed dealing with agreement in C. This contrasts with 1 st and 2 nd person agreement which cannot remain attached to the verb in the presence of an auxiliary. This difference in distribution follows from the assumption that 3 rd person agreement is associated with ν. Consequently, the verb does not have to move past I to associate with the agreement and thus the presence of an auxiliary has no effect on the position of 3 rd person agreement.
Evidence for ν-agreement
The second property that sets apart 3 rd person agreement in ν from 1 st and 2 nd person agreement in C is that the former is not sensitive to clause-typing unlike the latter. The data in (34) establish that the appearance of 3 rd person agreement is independent of the clause type. And moreover they show that 3 rd person transitive agreement can co-occur with other types of 3 rd person agreement, both of which are located higher up in the tree (i.e., INFL or C). That is, in embedded nominalized clauses, 3 rd person subject agreement is expressed twice if the verb is transitive: once as possessive agreement on the complementizer (kw'-s-es) and once on the verb (34b). Similarly, in a subjunctive transitive clause 3 rd person agreement occurs twice: once in the form of subjunctive agreement on the auxiliary (li-s) and once in the form of transitive agreement on the verb (34c). Furthermore, these examples also establish that 3 rd person agreement is not in complementary distribution with complementizers (unlike 1 st and 2 nd person subject clitics). This much establishes that transitive agreement has a distribution different from C-agreement (as well as subjunctive and possessive agreement) and that it occurs in a position lower than C-agreement.
We can now understand the fact that 3 rd person agreement is sensitive to transitivity: information about transitivity is encoded in ν. Agreement is generally sensitive to information encoded in the head it associates with. We have seen that C-agreement is sensitive to clause-typing. Furthermore, subject/verb agreement in English is associated with I (which is instantiated as T(ENSE) in English), and consequently it is sensitive to tense. For example, in (35) rd person subject agreement is associated with ν we predict that agreement is thematically conditioned. That is, while subject verb agreement in English is associated with T and thus agrees with the grammatical subject in SpecTP, subject verb agreement in ν is predicted to agree with the thematic subject. This prediction is borne out. 3 rd person transitive subject agreement is restricted to active sentences, but cannot occur in passive sentences (unlike English subject-verb agreement):
(38) máy-t-em te Konrad help-TRANS-PASS DET Konrad 'Somebody helped Konrad.'/'Konrad was helped.' I thus conclude that 3 rd person subject agreement is associated with ν which accounts for the sensitivity to transitivity.
Cross-Salish evidence
According to the proposed analysis, different agreement types are associated with different syntactic positions (see Davis 2000) : C and ν, respectively. This is however not the only difference between the two types of agreement: ν agreement is restricted to 3 rd person while C agreement is restricted to 1 st and 2 nd person. This is repeated below for convenience:
The present analysis has nothing to say about this pattern: the absence of 3 rd person agreement in C and the absence of 1 st and 2 nd person agreement in ν is purely accidental. In contrast, analyses which take this distribution to reflect the workings of the person-hierarchy would expect precisely this distribution. For example, Jelinek & Carnie 2003 suggest that a distribution of this type is semantically conditioned and follows from a particular mapping principle according to which presuppositional material is mapped to a position higher in the clause than non-presuppositional material (Diesing 1992) . Accordingly, 1 st and 2 nd person as inherently presuppositional nominals are mapped to a position higher in the tree; in contrast 3 rd person is not inherently presuppositional and is therefore mapped to a position lower in the tree. This appears to be an advantage of an analysis based on the person-hierarchy.
I will now show evidence that the present analysis is nevertheless on the right track. In particular, we will see evidence that paradigmatic gaps are indeed accidental and not semantically conditioned.
In particular, ν agreement is not restricted to 3 rd person across all the Salish languages. For example, in Shuswap ν-agreement is restricted to transitive subjects (like in Halkomelem) but unlike in Halkomelem it has ν-agreement across all persons. As a consequence, the system looks rather different: while intransitive subject agreement is marked with subject clitics ((40); C-agreement in our analysis) while transitive subject agreement is marked with so called subject suffixes ((41); ν-agreement in our analysis). 'She/he squeals on him/her.' Kuipers (1974:48) Note that this type of system is completely unexpected under a personhierarchy account: here 1 st and 2 nd person agreement is not necessarily mapped onto a position high in the clause. The Shuswap system is however consistent with the account developed here according to which the paradigmatic gaps are accidental.
The Halkomelem system has developed out of the Proto-Salish system (as reconstructed by Davis 2000) in the following way. Proto-Salish had two full agreement paradigms (except that 3 rd person C-agreement was always zero) as summarized in The Halkomelem system may have developed on the basis of the transparent morphological relation between ν-and C-agreement (indicated by the bold part of C-agreement). Suppose that ν-agreement was reanalyzed as being part of C-agreement. The only cell where this reanalysis cannot take place is 3 rd person because there is no 3 rd person C-agreement. Thus by reanalyzing the ν-agreement paradigm as being part of the C-agreement paradigm, we arrive at the highly defective ν-agreement system of Halkomelem and consequently at the apparent ergative system, which is split along 1 st /2 nd vs. 3 rd person. For completeness, we also note that 1 st and 2 nd person object agreement is always mapped in a position low in the tree (as evidenced by the fact that it consistently appears on the verb). 'I help you pl .' e. máy-t-es help-TRANS-3S 'He helps him. ' Galloway (1980: 126) If the high position of 1 st and 2 nd person subject clitics were indeed a consequence of the person-hierarchy and its mapping onto syntactic structure, it would be unclear as to why 1 st and 2 nd person objects do not have to be mapped to a higher position as well.
I thus conclude that an analysis which is not based on the person-hierarchy is empirically more adequate and that we are indeed dealing with accidental gaps that are associated with each of the paradigms discussed in this section.
Person-based transitive gaps
I now turn to the second question we were left with at the end of section 3: What rules out the combination of 3 rd person subject and 2 nd person object agreement?
Arbitrary gaps with syntactic restrictions
We have seen that a person-hierarchy account does not adequately account for the facts. In this section, I argue that this gap is best analyzed as being partly restricted by the morpho-syntax of agreement but partly arbitrary (i.e., unpredictable; see Brown, Koch and Wiltschko 2007 for a detailed discussion). The systematic aspect of the attested gap concerns the type of agreement involved: object agreement and subject suffixes (but not subject clitics). I propose that this restriction on the transitive gap is syntactically conditioned: a gap can only arise when two agreement endings are associated with the same syntactic head, which in this case is ν ( While the configuration illustrated in (43), where object and subject agreement are associate with the same syntactic head (ν), is necessary for a transitive gap to arise, it does not constitute a sufficient condition. That is, in Halkomelem there are two agreement combinations of the type illustrated in (43) that are illformed (*2obj.sg-3s; *2obj.pl-3s) while all other possible combinations are well-formed.
In the remainder of this section I will show evidence for this proposal. In section 5.2, I present evidence for the claim that object agreement (along with subject suffixes) is associated with ν. In section 5.3, I present evidence for the claim that gaps are restricted to combinations of the sorts illustrated in (43). And finally in section 5.4, I present cross-Salish evidence that the gaps are indeed arbitrary and not restricted by the person-hierarchy.
Evidence for object agreement in ν
Recall that we have seen evidence to the effect that 3 rd person subject suffixes are associated with ν (see section 4.3). Given that object agreement linearly precedes subject agreement (44), it follows that object agreement must be attached before subject agreement. 
